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FRAMEWORK 
ELIZABETH GARRETT* & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The widespread use of the initiative process and the perception that it 
has lead to considerable negative consequences have prompted calls for 
reform. In this Article, we focus on two complaints about initiatives that 
can be addressed through a new legal framework.1 First, some have argued 
that the policy choices made through direct democracy are often not 
socially optimal, and the process through which initiatives are passed may 
make welfare-reducing decisions inevitable.2 Reform proposals often aim 
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 1. We do not consider disclosure provisions that should be part of any initiative framework to 
improve voter competence in direct democracy because these have already been the subject of more 
scholarly analysis than our other proposals. For reviews of the extensive empirical literature, see, e.g., 
Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237 (2004); Michael S. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and 
“Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1157–59 (2003); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, 
Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 476–77 (2004); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Commentaries on Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayers’s Voting with Dollars: A New 
Paradigm for Campaign Finance Reform: Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011 passim (2003). 
Similarly, we do not tackle the issue of campaign finance regulations. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, 
Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure 
Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (2005). 
 2. Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and 
Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005). 
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to correct this complaint by increasing the hurdles to ballot qualification. 
This sort of reform is counterproductive in several ways. By increasing the 
“price” of ballot access, such responses are likely to exacerbate the current 
disproportionate influence of money.3 Moreover, there is no reason to 
believe that a more difficult qualification process will impede more socially 
suboptimal policies than policies that are welfare-enhancing and yet 
stymied in the legislature by powerful interest groups. We argue that a 
better focus of initiative reform would provide other checks and balances 
throughout the process, not primarily during the qualification period. 
Second, initiatives, once enacted, often fail to be implemented by 
government officials.4 Few reform proposals are aimed at this post-
enactment problem; they do not take account of the likelihood that 
government officials who resisted passing the proposal are likely to 
continue to undermine it during the implementation phase. In contrast, our 
framework includes a new institution to monitor compliance with popularly 
generated initiatives and ensure greater enforcement. We describe these 
two concerns in greater detail in Part II. 
Our proposal encompasses two main reforms, each targeting one of 
the two problems we identify. We propose a new comprehensive 
framework that keeps both the spirit and intent of the initiative process: the 
Dual Path Initiative Process with a Citizens Initiative Implementation 
Oversight Commission. To construct the Dual Path Initiative Process, we 
borrow from the practice in American legislatures to provide each bill three 
readings on separate days.5 Our framework establishes three readings—or 
distinct stages—for each initiative; these are described in Part III. 
 
 3. For a discussion of the role of money in direct democracy, see Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth 
R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for 
Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 73, 76–90 (M. Dane. 
Waters ed., 2001); Elisabeth Gerber, Prospects for Reforming the Initiative Process (June 6, 2000) 
(paper presented to the National Direct Democracy Conference, University of Virginia Center for 
Government Studies), http://www.ni4d.us/library/prospects.htm. 
 4. ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D. RODERICK KIEWIET, 
STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 15–26 
(2001) [hereinafter GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE]; Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia & 
Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of 
Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. POL. 43 (2004) [hereinafter Gerber et al., The Politics of 
Implementation]. 
 5. See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 108-241, §§ XXIV–XXVI (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_109.html 
(“The second reading must regularly be on another day. . . . [T]he question will be whether it shall be 
committed, or engrossed and read a third time?”); STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. 
DOC. NO. 106-15, R. XIV, ¶ 2 (2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/ 
Standing_Rules_Senate.htm#14 (“Every bill and joint resolution shall receive three readings previous to 
its passage which readings on demand of any Senator shall be on three different legislative days . . . .”); 
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The first reading of the initiative occurs when only a brief description 
of the proposal, providing the purpose of the initiative and the general 
outline of the solution to be adopted, is circulated for signatures. This 
process is designed to gauge public support for the general objective of the 
proposal’s backers. No legislative language need be drafted at this time; 
instead, advocates of change provide a relatively brief policy statement that 
sets out the essential elements of their constitutional or statutory proposal. 
When sufficient signatures have been obtained and the process moves 
to the second reading, there is a period of three months during which the 
proponents and the legislature have the opportunity to draft legislative or 
constitutional language to submit to the people for a vote. The legislature 
must hold hearings on the proposal. During this second reading, lawmakers 
and ballot measure proponents can negotiate so that a compromise can be 
passed as a statute through the traditional legislative process, or a mutually 
acceptable constitutional amendment can be submitted for a vote. Even if 
there is no agreement reached, this period provides flexibility so that 
drafting errors can be identified, likely consequences of the new policy can 
be assessed, and language can be revised. At the end of this period, if the 
proponents of change are not satisfied with the legislature’s response, they 
can submit to the people a detailed proposal designed to advance the 
purpose of the policy statement. In essence, the second reading stage takes 
advantage of the interaction between direct democracy and representative 
institutions possible in the hybrid democracy that characterizes states with 
the initiative and referendum processes.6 If the legislature fails to act in a 
manner acceptable to the initiative proponents, then they can place a 
measure on the ballot, offering to the public a substitute for the legislature’s 
action (or inaction). 
The third reading period occurs after an initiative—constitutional or 
statutory—is enacted through a vote of the people. Popular constitutional 
initiatives will expire after ten years and must be reenacted, perhaps as 
amended. Constitutional provisions can be placed on the ballot for 
 
WYO. STATE LEG., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. 7-1 (2006), available at 
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2006/rules/house.htm (“Every bill shall receive three separate readings, 
previous to its being passed . . . .”); H.R. Res. 318, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. R. 41(a) (N.C. 
2005), available at http://www.ncleg.net/house/documents/houserules.html (“Every bill shall receive 
three readings in the House prior to its passage.”). In reality, bills are seldom read in their entirety, and 
one or two of the three readings are usually pro forma parliamentary exercises, but representative 
institutions have other institutional checks that ameliorate any deliberative loss that may occur. 
 6. See Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096 (2005). A hybrid 
democracy is one that incorporates both representative and direct democracy as essential elements of 
lawmaking. 
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reenactment in two ways: the legislature can resubmit the provision to the 
people or the proponents can requalify the measure for the ballot by 
meeting less onerous signature requirements. In both cases, reenactment is 
permanent. Popular statutory initiatives will also be less durable because 
the legislature may, after a period of time, amend or repeal any such 
initiative. 
Part IV describes the aspects of our proposal aimed at the 
implementation problem. Our framework includes an entirely new system 
for oversight of the implementation and enforcement of popular initiatives. 
Here we draw on the experience with the few initiatives that have set up 
special oversight bodies, such as the Fair Political Practices Commission7 
or the commission overseeing the stem cell initiative passed by 
Californians in 2004.8 Our framework also taps into the current enthusiasm 
for increased citizen involvement in policymaking, seen in the increasing 
use of initiatives over the past three decades9 and the recent creation of a 
Citizens’ Assembly in British Columbia to consider and propose sweeping 
reform of the system of political representation.10 We propose a Citizens 
Initiative Implementation Oversight Commission (“CIIOC”) to ensure that 
enacted initiatives are faithfully implemented by state and local officials, 
who might otherwise work to obstruct or delay implementation of ballot 
measures they opposed. The CIIOC will include members named in each 
successful popular initiative; it will be provided a staff and funding 
sufficient to discharge its oversight function; and it will have the authority 
to conduct hearings, produce reports, participate in administrative 
proceedings, and even pursue litigation. The CIIOC will also be involved in 
 
 7. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 81000–83124 (West 2005). 
 8. Proposition 71, the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, designated state money for 
stem cell research and created a commission to oversee its disbursement. CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, §§ 
1–7; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125290.10–.70 (West 2006). The constitutionality of the 
initiative was challenged in court by small-government and conservative religious groups, alleging that 
it did not provide sufficient legislative control over the expenditure of state funds, as required by the 
California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 3. The trial court held that the measure was 
constitutional. People’s Advocate v. Indep. Citizens’ Oversight Comm., No. HG05 206766, HG05 
235177, 2006 WL 1417983 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006). 
 9. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., OVERVIEW OF INITIATIVE USE 1904–2006 (2006), 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20(2006-11).pdf. 
 10. See BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, MAKING EVERY 
VOTE COUNT: THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM IN BRITISH COLUMBIA (2004), available at 
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final_report.pdf. See also Heather Gerken, Op-Ed., 
Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform, ROLL CALL, Nov. 15, 2005, at 4, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2005/11/15_gerken.php. During the 2005–06 session of the 
California Legislature, Assemblyman Joseph Canciamilla introduced the Citizens Assembly on 
Electoral Systems Act of 2006. Assemb. Const. Amend. 28, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/aca_28_bill_20060125_introduced.html. 
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the preelection initiative process, determining whether the initiative drafted 
by proponents is consistent with the initial policy statement and providing 
analysis of any legislative response. A statewide citizens oversight 
commission is a novel reform, not currently used by any state. Some 
individual initiatives establish special commissions to implement and 
enforce the particular initiative, but we are not aware of any state that relies 
on an independent body, with a staff, to investigate and enforce all popular 
initiatives. 
Much of our analysis is focused on California, both with regard to the 
structure of the process and the examples we provide, because its initiative 
process has the fewest checks and balances of any of the states with hybrid 
systems. However, the Dual Path Initiative Framework, in whole or in part, 
could be used by any state with popular statutory or constitutional 
initiatives. Some states allow only constitutional initiatives to be proposed 
by the people and thus would adopt only those parts of the framework 
dealing with constitutional initiatives. Some states, as we will discuss, 
already have elements of our proposal as part of their initiative process, 
although none has adopted all aspects of our reform proposal.11 States 
without the direct popular initiative might consider this framework to allow 
an additional element of citizen involvement in lawmaking. All states with 
popular initiatives face the implementation problem and should consider 
adopting a reform along the lines of the oversight commission we describe. 
Finally, in Part V, we conclude with a brief discussion of some aspects 
of the new political equilibrium we expect after adoption of the Dual Path 
Initiative Framework and the CIIOC. The two parts of hybrid democracy—
the initiative process and representative institutions—react to changes in 
each other, and political actors alter their behavior to account for 
modification in political institutions. We believe that the new equilibrium 
will be an improvement over the status quo, providing checks and balances 
in both parts of hybrid democracy, ensuring fuller compliance with 
initiatives, and allowing for flexibility and change throughout the process 
and over time to reflect both input during policy consideration and 
experience as the new policy is implemented. 
II.  THE GOALS OF AN INITIATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A central element of American democracy is checks and balances. In 
Federalist 51, James Madison argued that “the constant aim is to divide 
 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 25–26 (discussing the indirect initiative); infra text 
accompanying notes 51–53 (discussing aspects of the process in Washington, Colorado, and generally). 
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and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a 
check on the other,”12 and in Federalist 47, he stated that “[t]he 
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self 
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”13 The numerous vetogates in the legislative process allow time 
for fact-finding and deliberation, provide opportunities to correct mistakes, 
and encourage compromise and change in legislative proposals to secure 
passage. If a proposal manages to navigate through all the legislative 
roadblocks, it still faces the possibility of a veto by the executive, and in 
many states, the executive can rewrite some bills through use of a line-item 
veto. Even with all these procedures, however, legislatures still enact 
hastily drafted laws with errors and unexpected consequences. But the 
process is constructed to guard against such bills, and if mistakes occur or 
an enactment proves unworkable or unwise in practice, the legislature can 
amend or repeal the bill. 
As currently configured, the initiative process in California and other 
initiative states lacks comparable checks. The requirement that supporters 
gather signatures within a certain period of time to place an initiative on the 
ballot can be an obstacle to advocates who lack access to substantial 
financial or human resources. But a well-funded group is guaranteed access 
to the ballot because it can hire professional firms and pay petition 
circulators,14 and a group with a motivated and large grassroots base may 
be able to gather enough signatures for ballot access, as long as it has 
sufficient time for circulation. Once the measure qualifies for the ballot, 
then the version submitted to a state official at the start of the petition 
circulation stage appears before the voters, without any further opportunity 
for amendment. Although opponents or state officials may challenge the 
initiative before an election on constitutional or other legal grounds, in 
many cases, courts decline to become involved until after the election.15 
 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 263 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
 14. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 
1849–54 (1999) [hereinafter Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting]. 
 15. California courts are particularly unwilling to block initiatives from the ballot; preelection 
challenges were successful only three times between 1912 and December 2002. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 9 (2002), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ 
init_history.pdf. Some other states allow more preelection review. For example, in Colorado  
a three-member Title Board reviews proposed initiatives to determine whether they comply 
with the state’s formal requirements (including, importantly, the state’s so-called “single 
subject rule.”) The process provides an opportunity for interested parties to appeal the Title 
Board’s decisions to the state Supreme Court, and thus the court has a formal filtering role 
prior to the election. 
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The only real check on initiative lawmaking authority is the public itself, 
and an initiative—whether constitutional or statutory—can be enacted in 
most states if it receives the votes of a majority of those voting on it.16 
After enactment, a court may strike the initiative down if it is found to 
be unconstitutional or to violate requirements such as the single subject 
rule.17 But, this check is essentially no different from what exists for 
legislative lawmaking.18 If the judiciary does not intervene, the only way to 
correct or repeal most initiatives is by enacting another initiative. In 
California, the state Constitution prohibits the legislature from amending or 
repealing a statutory initiative unless the initiative itself allows subsequent 
legislative involvement.19 All the other initiative states allow subsequent 
legislative involvement with respect to statutory initiatives, although 
sometimes only after a period of time or only by a supermajority vote. A 
few states prohibit repeal but allow the legislature to amend the initiative.20 
In many states, those who wish to insulate their initiative from the 
 
Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards 1 n.3 (Sept. 2–5, 
1999) (working paper, delivered at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Studies.htm; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-106 to -107 (2006). 
Like courts in most states, however, those in Colorado are more willing to strike down an initiative at 
this stage on procedural grounds than substantive ones. See Miller, supra, at 1 n.3. See also Advisory 
Op. to the Att’y Gen. Re: Indep. Nonpartisan Comm’n to Apportion Leg. and Cong. Dists. Which 
Replaces Apportionment by Leg., 926 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2006) (responding to a request by the attorney 
general and removing an initiative on reapportionment from the ballot because it violated the single 
subject requirement). 
 16. See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 26 (2003). 
 17. Between 1960 and 1999, fifty-five initiatives were adopted in California, thirty-six of which 
were challenged in court. As of September 1999, final judgment had been rendered with respect to 
thirty-two initiatives. Of those, fourteen were upheld (44%), eleven were invalidated in part (34%), and 
seven were invalidated in their entirety (22%). The courts therefore invalidated, at least in part, about 
33% of the initiatives enacted in California between 1960 and September 1999. Miller, supra note 15, at 
12. 
 18. All legislation can be attacked in court on constitutional grounds, and many state legislatures 
are subject to single subject requirements. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: 
The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957 app. A. Some commentators, 
however, have observed that courts may more rigorously apply single subject rules to direct legislation 
than traditionally enacted laws. See In re Title and Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005–2006 
#55, 138 P.3d 273, 283 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (Coats, J., dissenting) (“Although the majority opinion 
today pays homage to the [single subject] requirement’s dual concerns for secreting unrelated 
provisions and combining provisions too unpopular to succeed on their own, it understands the term 
‘subject’ to be so elastic as to give this court unfettered discretion to either approve or disapprove 
virtually any popularly-initiated ballot measure at will.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 511 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing California’s single subject rule). 
 19. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). 
 20. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 27 (providing state-specific details); infra notes 72–73. 
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possibility of legislative tinkering can use the constitutional initiative.21 
Constitutional initiatives can be changed only through another vote of the 
people. 
Another significant difference between representative and direct 
lawmaking involves the scope of the decisions that are made. Legislators 
can debate and amend statutes before enacting them, and they can 
deliberate and compromise over a proposed statute. Even legislatures 
governed by single subject requirements can alter the details of any bill, 
and the institutional arrangements in representative bodies allow 
lawmakers to bargain across several bills to facilitate compromise. Direct 
lawmaking is far more rigid: voters are presented with a binary choice on a 
policy—either to accept it or retain the status quo—and logrolling across 
initiatives is impossible, as is meaningful deliberation or debate among 
voters. Within the legislature, policymakers are better able to consider 
tradeoffs in state budget decisions; in contrast, the initiative process is 
susceptible to the pathologies of “sequential elimination agendas.”22 When 
people are asked to choose between alternatives over time without the 
opportunity to compare among the many alternatives directly, they cannot 
consider tradeoffs and are “almost certain to pass contradictory measures 
that have deleterious economic, social, or political consequences.”23 
Our first set of recommendations for the Dual Path Initiative Process 
therefore seeks to add appropriate checks into the initiative process. We 
 
 21. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 12 (providing a table showing states with constitutional 
initiatives, statutory initiatives, or both). 
 22. See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 963–66. Our proposal does not change the 
binary, sequential nature of the U.S. initiative process, although other formats for decisionmaking are 
possible. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, 4 ELECTION L.J. 139, 145–46 (2005) 
[hereinafter Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?] (describing a two-stage, multiple choice format used in 
New Zealand). However, our proposal requiring constitutional initiatives to expire and allowing 
subsequent legislative involvement with statutory ones will mitigate the welfare-reducing consequences 
of this decisionmaking pathology. See infra Part III.C. 
 23. Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 965–66. The structure of direct democracy—
presenting a series of questions on single subjects for a “yes” or “no” vote—impedes any 
straightforward consideration of tradeoffs and tends to obscure the tradeoffs that must necessarily be 
made in these decisions. Voters are not offered tradeoffs directly, which implies the tradeoffs are not in 
their choice set and thus would be difficult or impossible to consider. Furthermore, in many states that 
apply a single subject rule to initiatives, voters are forbidden from considering tradeoffs. A considerable 
amount of scholarship has determined that voters do not consider tradeoffs unless they are squarely 
presented with them. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 205–87 
(1964); Jack Citrin, Do People Want Something for Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and Government 
Spending, 32 NAT’L TAX J. (SUPP.) 113 (1979); James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit & 
Robert F. Rich, The Political Environment and Citizen Competence, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 410 (2001); 
Andre Modigliani & Franco Modigliani, The Growth of the Federal Deficit and the Role of Public 
Attitudes, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 459 (1987). 
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proceed from a very different starting point than most initiative reformers. 
Many other reformers work to increase the initial hurdles to ballot access; 
for example, they often advocate increasing signature thresholds.24 In our 
view, raising the costs of obtaining a vote further tilts the playing field in 
favor of moneyed interests and away from grassroots majoritarian interests 
seeking to use the process as it was intended to operate. Our preference is 
to leave the ability to begin the initiative process unchanged—indeed, make 
the process somewhat easier by requiring only a policy statement and not 
text before petitions can be circulated—and to include more checks and 
balances in the process after qualification. In that way, groups and 
individuals with proposals stymied in the legislature can use direct 
democracy to seek a place on the agenda, but any policy that results is more 
likely to improve social welfare. 
Other reformers have suggested that California eliminate the direct 
initiative and replace it with a traditional indirect initiative. The indirect 
initiative currently exists in nine states for either constitutional 
amendments, statutes, or both.25 The indirect initiative process allows the 
legislature a formal role in the process before any measure is submitted to 
the public. Generally, the legislature is required to hold hearings on an 
initiative that has gained a certain number of signatures, and legislators 
must vote on the proposal. In some states, the legislature may amend the 
initiative; in others, the legal framework requires lawmakers to take an up-
or-down vote on the initiative as presented by proponents. Usually in the 
indirect initiative process, if the legislature enacts the proposed initiative—
or, in some states, enacts a law substantially the same as the proposal—the 
question does not appear on the ballot. If the legislature refuses to act, the 
measure is submitted to the people. In a few states, supporters are required 
to obtain additional signatures to move past the legislature to the people 
 
 24. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process: A Proposal to 
Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 291, 
303 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995) (recommending increasing the signature threshold for 
constitutional initiatives as part of a larger reform proposal with elements of indirect initiatives); Mark 
Ridley-Thomas & Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, Now That It’s Finally Over, Let’s Revamp the Recall, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at B15. But see John Ferejohn, Reforming the Initiative Process, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra, at 313, 315 (proposing that once an initiative has 
qualified, competing initiatives on the same topic could qualify with fewer signatures). 
 25. For a discussion of the variations on the indirect initiative, see CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN 
FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 104–05, 
117 (unz.org 2003) (1992) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE]. Fewer states allow the indirect 
initiative than the direct initiative; two states have an indirect constitutional initiative process, and nine 
have an indirect statutory initiative process. See Fred Silva, The Indirect Initiative Process, in WATERS, 
supra note 16, at 13–15. 
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even if the legislature does nothing. In other states, the supporters’ version 
is placed on the ballot alongside any legislative version that is different. 
Although our Dual Path Initiative Process is influenced by the indirect 
initiative, simply requiring all states to offer only the indirect initiative as 
currently configured is an unrealistic reform proposal. California had the 
indirect initiative until 1966, and it was seldom used.26 Given the public’s 
strong support for the direct initiative, it is unlikely that voters would 
accede to a reform that replaces the well-liked direct initiative with the 
scorned indirect one. Instead, we opt to keep the direct initiative, but we 
add characteristics of the indirect initiative process that might eliminate the 
need in some cases to take the measure to the people for a vote. Under the 
Dual Path Initiative Process, initiative proponents remain in the driver’s 
seat; they decide whether the legislature’s response is sufficient to 
ameliorate their concerns or whether they will draft legislative or 
constitutional language and submit their policy change to the people. Our 
new framework nonetheless adds checks and balances to the current 
initiative process that are aimed either to eliminate the problems we have 
identified or to mitigate their consequences. The latter occurs because of 
the third reading of the framework, which requires popular constitutional 
initiatives to be reauthorized and allows legislative involvement with all 
popular statutory initiatives. The durability of popular change is thereby 
reduced relative to the status quo. 
By itself, the addition of such checks and balances to the initiative 
process would do much to improve the process. But how valuable are 
initiatives if they remain unimplemented and subverted, which is often the 
outcome now? The people vote to enact policy, but then they return to their 
lives, assuming that government officials will follow their directions. They 
do not have the ability, or often the interest, to monitor implementation by 
the executive branch, sometimes with involvement of the legislature. 
Because elected officials often opposed the policy put into place by direct 
democracy, they are not likely to eagerly or aggressively work to follow the 
public mandate.  
As a matter of fact, those in charge of implementation are often the 
very agents the initiative was designed to control. For example, the 
initiative might enact sweeping reform of the education system, which must 
then be implemented by the Department of Education, school 
administrators, and teachers. Or the initiative might enact public financing 
 
 26. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 47 & n.43. 
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of state campaigns, but the legislature has to appropriate money for it.27 
There is ample reason to worry that these lawmakers and administrators 
will not enthusiastically implement the policies they refused to adopt.28 In a 
way, this is the opposite of the problem identified before—rather than too 
few vetogates, which characterizes the process of proposing and enacting 
initiatives, there are too many checks standing in the way of effective 
implementation and most of those are controlled by officials who are likely 
hostile to the reform. 
When courts strike down initiatives and block their implementation, 
they justify their action because the popular law is unconstitutional or in 
some other way legally flawed. The people cannot get what they want 
because their desires conflict with larger principles and values, such as 
individual rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. But when state 
officials block initiatives by surreptitiously undermining them, they follow 
their own preferences rather than those of the voters, and they do so in 
ways designed to reduce accountability. Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and 
Kiewiet have found that certain conditions allow government officials to 
undermine or ignore initiatives more easily.29 First, substantial technical or 
political costs will lead to lower levels of compliance because the net value 
of implementation is reduced. Second, if implementers face significant 
sanctions for noncompliance, they are more likely to work to effectively 
implement the initiative. Third, when it is easier for the public or others 
who support the initiative to observe compliance, it is more likely that 
officials will comply. Finally, “[u]nder normal conditions, as the number of 
people required for full compliance increases, the likelihood of full 
compliance goes to zero.”30 A new framework for initiatives could increase 
the likelihood of substantial compliance with initiatives by changing some 
of these conditions. Our proposed CIIOC improves monitoring and can 
 
 27. It has been suggested to us that, rather than using an enforcement commission, we should just 
urge initiative writers to put clear enforcement standards into the language of the initiative, such as 
reporting requirements and strict penalties for noncompliance. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE 
INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 22–25. These are all good ideas, but the problem is that they do not answer 
the questions: To whom is the legislature supposed to report? Who decides if a sanction is to be 
imposed, and, if imposed, who decides the remedy and the penalized party? Who then enforces the 
enforcement? The CIIOC will be able to determine if the initiative has been implemented or not and can 
bring to bear the only enforcements possible or necessary, that is, court or electoral sanctions to those 
who have impeded the implementation of an initiative. The CIIOC will be in a position to bring to the 
public’s attention the lack of enforcement of an initiative, and it will be up to the public to decide if it is 
a wrong that is worth righting through the ballot box. 
 28. Gerber et al., The Politics of Implementation, supra note 4, at 52–56. 
 29. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 20–25. See also Lupia & 
Matsusaka, supra note 1, at 475–76 (discussing scholarship on the “implementation problem”). 
 30. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 24. 
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better ensure that there are sanctions, political and legal, for 
noncompliance. It thus responds to the first three conditions identified 
above. 
Although one response to the problems in the initiative process is to 
eliminate direct democracy, we do not advocate that path. First, we do not 
believe it is realistic. Polls consistently demonstrate that citizens like the 
initiative process and trust its outcomes more than they trust legislation 
enacted by their representatives.31 Because sweeping changes to the 
initiative process require constitutional amendment, the people will be 
involved in any reform, and they are unlikely to get rid of initiatives 
altogether. Polls suggest, however, that reforms along the lines of our three 
readings proposal—at least the first two stages—would be viewed 
favorably by many Californians.32  
Second, we view a properly constructed initiative process as a 
necessary component of a well-functioning democracy because it provides 
a way around the conflicts of interest that legislators possess with regard to 
some matters of institutional structure. Often lawmakers themselves 
determine the rules of democracy (for example, in enacting campaign 
finance laws or in establishing electoral districts). Under such 
circumstances, there is the well-founded concern that self-interest will 
prevail over the public interest and that rules will be chosen to entrench the 
already powerful, decrease competition from the outside, and silence new 
voices.33 Thus, one advantage of hybrid democracy is that it allows the 
people a formalized role in institutional design decisions. 
 
 31. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY AUGUST 2004: CALIFORNIANS 
AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 17 (2004) (stating that 74% of California residents think the initiative 
process is a “good thing” and 59% believe that policy decisions made by voters through initiatives are 
probably better than policy decisions made by elected officials); Jack Citrin & Jonathan Cohen, Viewing 
the Recall from Above and Below, in ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA RECALL 68, 74–82 (Shaun Bowler & 
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2006) (citing several recent polls confirming California’s strong and increasing 
support of direct legislation). Even after the 2005 special election in California, in which voters rejected 
all the initiatives, Californians are still enthusiastic about direct democracy. See MARK BALDASSARE, 
PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY NOVEMBER 2005: SPECIAL SURVEY ON CALIFORNIANS AND THE INITIATIVE 
PROCESS 13 (2005) [hereinafter BALDASSARE, SPECIAL ELECTION POLL] (stating that nearly half (48%) 
of voters in the November 2005 special election said that public policies generated by the initiative 
process are probably better than those developed by the governor and legislature; only three in ten 
thought the voters’ decisions are probably worse). 
 32. BALDASSARE, SPECIAL ELECTION POLL, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that 77% of special 
election voters favored creating a new system of review and revision of proposed initiatives to avoid 
legal issues and drafting errors; 83% favored allowing time for the legislature and the proponents to 
reach a compromise before initiatives can be presented on the ballot). 
 33. Given the inherent conflicts of interest faced by lawmakers in designing the rules that will 
shape their careers, even some who have substantial reservations about the initiative process 
nonetheless argue that more directly involving the people in decisionmaking about democratic 
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Similarly, the initiative process can provide a majoritarian escape 
valve if the legislative process is captured by special interests. The absence 
of checks and balances in the initiative process reduces the influence of 
minority interests with strong preferences that can use legislative vetogates 
to block policies they oppose or force compromise to gain special benefits. 
Even though the agenda of direct democracy tends to be determined by 
well-funded groups who can use paid signature gatherers to assure ballot 
access, policy is enacted only when it can obtain majority approval on 
election day. Thus, the majoritarian initiative process can provide a 
counterbalance to the legislative process; indeed, the presence of a robust 
initiative process may change the output from the traditional legislature so 
that it enacts policies closer to the median voter’s preference.34 Thus, we 
believe complete elimination of direct democracy is not warranted—the 
better answer is to improve the initiative process. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK TO PROVIDE CHECKS AND BALANCES IN 
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS: A DUAL PATH INITIATIVE PROCESS 
Our reforms allow initiatives to continue to play a necessary role to 
check the self-interest of legislators in the arena of government reform and 
to circumvent the power of well-funded, organized groups who block 
policy favored by a majority. We do not favor unchecked populism, 
however. Our goal is to strengthen both the initiative process and 
representative institutions, and we believe meeting that objective requires a 
 
institutions is justified. See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR 
ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2002); Dennis F. Thompson, The Role of Theorists 
and Citizens in Just Elections: A Response to Professors Cain, Garrett, and Sabl, 4 ELECTION L.J. 153, 
158–60 (2005). For a less guarded advocacy of direct democracy to design democratic institutions, see 
Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, supra note 22. Whether the initiative process actually leads to 
different electoral institutions is a matter of scholarly contention. Compare Nathaniel Persily & Melissa 
Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election 
Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997 (2005) (finding the initiative process related to states’ adopting 
nonpartisan redistricting commissions, legislative term limits, and public financing for legislative 
races), with John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Electoral Reform, in THE MARKETPLACE OF 
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (Michael P. McDonald & John 
Samples eds., 2006) (finding that the initiative has little effect on electoral laws except for the adoption 
of legislative term limits). 
 34. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83–92 (2004) (discussing the various “frictions” that cause 
representatives to get out of step with their constituents); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to 
the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 107–17 (1996) (analyzing when and how the 
legislature will be constrained by the threat of initiatives); John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy 
Works, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 185, 192 (2005) (“Since ballot propositions are filtered through 
the electorate, only policies that make the median voter better off can gain approval in an election or 
credibly threaten the legislature.”). 
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fundamental restructuring of the popular initiative process. Our reform 
package would itself require a vote of the people to be adopted as an 
amendment to the state constitution.35 Figure 1 on the following page 
presents a graphical representation of the first set of reforms we propose, 
dubbed the Dual Path Initiative Process. 
 
 35. In California, it could be argued that our package of reforms is a revision of the California 
Constitution, rather than an amendment, because it alters the power of the electors in the initiative 
process through the three readings framework and alters the power of the legislature through the 
oversight commission. Constitutional revision cannot be done through the initiative process but can be 
done by the legislature, if two-thirds of each house votes to put the revision on the ballot, or by 
constitutional convention. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1–3. Courts have defined what constitutes a 
revision rather than an amendment, but the line between the two is not clear. See, e.g., Legislature v. 
Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319 (Cal. 1991) (finding that an initiative that imposed legislative term limits and 
other reforms was an amendment, because it did not “necessarily or inevitably appear from [its] 
face . . . that the measure [would] substantially alter the basic governmental framework set forth in our 
Constitution”); McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 799 (Cal. 1948) (finding that a wide-ranging 
initiative that, among other things, created a Pension Commission would “substantially alter the purpose 
and . . . attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast” and thus constituted a 
revision). Given the restructuring we propose, it is possible our framework would be considered a 
revision in California; in which case, it should originate in the legislature. We believe, however, that 
our framework does not effect such “far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan” 
to necessarily rise to the level of revision. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978). We do not know if similar issues would be raised in 
other states considering reform along the same lines we suggest. 
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A.  THE FIRST READING OF AN INITIATIVE: QUALIFYING A GENERAL 
POLICY STATEMENT 
When citizens sign a petition to put an initiative on the ballot, few, if 
any, spend time reading the actual text and considering the details of the 
proposal. At most, they make their decision on the basis of the objective of 
the initiative.36 Do they want the state to play a larger role in funding stem 
cell research? Are they unhappy with the current laws regulating parental 
notification in the case of minors seeking an abortion? Should the state 
establish more community mental health services and pay for them with a 
tax on millionaires? In many cases, citizens decide whether to sign a 
petition on the basis of who is advocating the change. Do they tend to favor 
policies put forward by insurance companies? Are they sympathetic to the 
goals of the Sierra Club? Of course, many are willing to sign anything 
pushed in front of them on their way in to shop at Costco or Wal-Mart, and 
they are sometimes willing to sign several petitions at one time, without 
even knowing the subject matter of the measures. They simply want to get 
past the petition circulator and have no objection to anything being placed 
on the ballot. After all, they do not have to vote for it. 
Given the reality of the signature gathering phase, there is no benefit 
to requiring that legislative or constitutional language be included with the 
petitions at this stage in the process. All citizens need is a brief, 
straightforward description of the policy supported by the proponents and a 
clear identification of the major groups behind the signature drive. This 
policy statement represents the first reading period in Figure 1. We propose 
that at the ballot qualification stage, initiative advocates submit a policy 
 
 36. We know of no direct evidence revealing how voters decide to sign initiative petitions. We 
note, however, that every state provides a brief summary of the ballot initiative on the petition. In 
addition, voters generally do not know much about public policy when asked. Taken together, these 
realities suggest that most voters are unlikely to know much about policy specifics and may often 
decide only on the basis of general policy goals. It may be the case that many voters are not even aware 
of the general policy objectives when they sign petitions, perhaps signing because they want to end the 
interaction with the signature gatherer and get on with their shopping, because they believe any 
question should be posed to voters, without coming to a conclusion about the merits, or because they 
believe their interests are aligned with those groups coordinating the petition drive and therefore they do 
not need to know more about the measure’s substance. These voters would be made no worse off by our 
proposal; very few voters will find themselves denied information they need to make the decision 
whether to sign a petition or not. Literature on general voter ignorance is copious. See, e.g., ANGUS 
CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER & DONALD E. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 
(1960); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS 
AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy 
in the American Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005); Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information 
Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996). 
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statement of no more than 500 words. Although the statement can be 
generally phrased, proponents will have an incentive to provide clear 
information about all major pieces of their proposal because, in later stages 
of the process, the legislative or constitutional language they develop will 
be measured against this policy statement. Material in the final version of 
the initiative that is not fairly encompassed by the initial statement will be 
stricken from the text presented to voters. The standard used to assess 
whether particular text is consistent with the policy statement is one of 
reasonable notice: Did the formulation provide notice of this aspect of the 
measure to a reasonable citizen asked to sign the petition? If not, would 
that citizen consider this a material aspect of the policy or merely a 
reasonable means of implementing the objective that had been clearly 
described? 
Because the second reading period allows drafters to change their 
proposal to reflect new information and encourages negotiations with the 
legislature or other groups, the policy statement should be drafted so that it 
can encompass a proposal that may be somewhat different from the original 
vision. The statement must contain some specifics, however, both to 
provide voters enough sense of the proposal to decide whether to sign the 
petition and to meaningfully shape the second reading period. We suggest 
that each policy statement follow the outline of the Mischief Rule set out in 
Heydon’s Case,37 one of the classic statutory interpretation cases. A 
legislative act involves describing the status quo, identifying the “mischief 
and defect” in the status quo, providing a “remedy” to solve the defect, and 
determining its benefits and any costs. Over time this format will become 
familiar to voters so they can quickly grasp the import of any petition being 
circulated. 
So, for example, a policy statement in the area of legislative 
redistricting could describe the absence of competition because of partisan 
and bipartisan gerrymanders, argue that this reality reduces electoral 
choices and undermines the responsiveness of lawmakers to voters, identify 
nonpartisan redistricting commissions as the solution because they remove 
some of the partisanship from the redistricting process, and provide an 
estimate of any costs relative to the status quo. Drafters would want to 
provide enough information so that voters would have a relatively clear 
sense of the reform being proposed, but allow enough flexibility to refine 
and change the proposal during the second reading phase. Language that 
 
 37. Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.). See also LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE 
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESK REFERENCE 29–51 (1992) (describing a similar kind of approach to 
drafting statutes, that is, identify the problem and choose a solution from policy alternatives). 
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generally identifies a nonpartisan redistricting commission as a solution 
postpones to the second reading period the determination of whether that 
commission will consist of judges, citizens, or people appointed by 
political officials. Although drafters could specify one of these models in 
the policy statement, they would not need to. Indeed, further specification 
could rule out possible compromises during negotiations in the second 
reading period. If voters who signed the general policy statement disagree 
with the drafters’ ultimate choice—for example, voters prefer citizens 
commissions and the drafters decide to use judges—they can defeat the 
proposal at the polls. 
The signature thresholds and time to gather signatures would remain 
unchanged from current law. It is not the number of signatures or the length 
of time provided for petition circulation we object to; rather, we want to 
provide only necessary information to those who sign the petitions while 
allowing proponents time during the next stage to develop the details of the 
initiative’s text that will implement their policy objectives. Thus, unlike 
other reform proposals focused on making ballot access more difficult, the 
framework we propose does not increase the “price” of qualifying 
initiatives for the ballot, which would further amplify the role of money in 
the process.38 Instead, the new process may somewhat reduce the costs of 
qualifying a ballot measure, because fewer resources would be required to 
draft this sort of a statement. Any reduction in costs is likely to be 
relatively minimal, however, because most of the expense of qualifying a 
ballot measure is in the form of payment for petition circulators, an expense 
that remains unchanged. Thus, our framework does not eliminate the 
influence of money in the qualification stage; presumably, well-funded 
groups and individuals will still find it relatively easy to qualify policy 
statements as long as they can pay signature gatherers, and they will use 
their resources to frame their policy statements so they motivate people to 
sign petitions.39 
 
 38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 39. To get an initiative on the ballot in California, the cost has been estimated at “anywhere from 
one to two million dollars,” a substantial chunk of which goes to paying petition circulators. DAVID S. 
BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 69, 72 (2000). 
Eliminating paid petition circulators is not an option under current constitutional jurisprudence. Meyer 
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423–24 (1988). There might be, however, some flexibility to regulate how they 
are paid. See ANDREW M. GLOGER, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., REP. 2006-1, PAID PETITIONERS 
AFTER PRETE (2006), http://law.usc.edu/academics/assets/docs/PaidPetitionersafterPrete.pdf. 
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1.  Emphasizing Policy Objectives over Detailed Language 
There are at least two disadvantages to the current system of requiring 
a formal text of the initiative at the petition circulation stage; we eliminate 
both. First, presently the legislative or constitutional text is emphasized at 
the beginning of the initiative process, even though the actual language 
plays little role in citizens’ decision to sign petitions. In California, 
proponents must submit the text of the initiative to the secretary of state to 
obtain permission to begin gathering signatures. The attorney general then 
drafts a title and summary, which are typically relatively legalistic in 
tone.40 All of this information—title, official summary, and text—are 
provided with the petition.41 In contrast, our proposal focuses attention on 
writing an easily understood description of the general policy objective 
behind the initiative and providing voters a sense of the interests funding 
the petition circulation effort.42 The attorney general will still provide a title 
for the policy statement that would appear on petitions and the ballot, but 
no official summary is required at this stage. 
One might object to circulating only a general policy statement, 
because it somehow undermines the validity of signatures. Citizens who 
sign the petition, the argument goes, want a particular statutory or 
constitutional proposal placed on the ballot; if the proponents can later 
develop the text of that proposal without somehow clearing it with the 
hundreds of thousands of signers, then there is no way to be certain that the 
voters who signed the petition would still favor putting this measure on the 
ballot. We find this argument unpersuasive. The details of a ballot measure 
play virtually no role in the decision to sign a petition. Moreover, in the 
end, the ballot measure becomes law only if it receives a majority vote. If 
those who signed the petitions accompanied by the general policy 
statement no longer support the initiative because they view the text 
presented to them as inconsistent with the original objective, they can vote 
against it. Most initiatives fail to pass,43 and voters tend to vote “no” when 
they are uncertain or worried about the effect of an initiative. We expect 
that one issue in any initiative campaign under our framework will be 
 
 40. “In providing the ballot title, the Attorney General shall give a true and impartial statement of 
the purpose of the measure in such language that the ballot title shall neither be an argument, nor be 
likely to create prejudice, for or against the proposed measure.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9051 (West 2003). 
 41. Id. §§ 9008, 9011. 
 42. We do not discuss this disclosure requirement at length. See Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, 
supra note 14, at 1884–86 (providing a fuller discussion of disclosure statutes). 
 43. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 7. The rates at which popular initiatives pass vary among the 
states. For example, 68% of initiatives in Florida passed between 1976 and 2000, while only 35% of 
initiatives passed in California from 1912 until 2000. Id. at 174, 93. 
GARR14 1/31/2007  10:39:15 PM 
318 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:299 
whether the text presented to the voters conforms to the policy statement 
that was circulated. Voters will, therefore, have ample opportunity to 
punish any opportunistic behavior. We note that one positive development 
from our new framework may be clearer drafting of the legislative or 
constitutional text so that initiative supporters will be able to credibly claim 
to voters that they are acting consistently with the policy objectives they 
identified generally during the first reading stage. 
2.  Allowing Flexibility in Drafting 
Second, in all states with the popular initiative, once the text of the 
statutory or constitutional proposal has been submitted to the relevant state 
official to obtain permission to circulate petitions, virtually no changes are 
allowed.44 The current initiative process is a rigid one, unforgiving of 
mistakes and not amenable to compromise and revision during the 
campaign period. A recent case in California demonstrates this rigidity. In 
the fall 2005 special election, the legislative redistricting initiative 
supported by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was nearly removed from 
the ballot when it was learned that supporters had submitted one version to 
the secretary of state and circulated petitions with another version. 
Although supporters argued that the differences were minor and technical, 
the attorney general went to court to remove the measure from the special 
election ballot. The California Supreme Court allowed the initiative to 
remain on the ballot, ruling tersely that there had been no showing that the 
people who signed the initiative had been misled.45 In the final decision 
after the initiative’s defeat, the California Supreme Court held that the 
proposition was properly submitted to the voters, notwithstanding the 
discrepancies, because the voters would not have been misled about the 
initiative if they relied on the version that did not appear on the ballot.46 It 
seems clear that if the proponents had purposefully made changes in the 
initiative after it was submitted to state officials at the beginning of the 
circulation process—even if the changes were to correct mistakes—or if 
 
 44. States with the direct initiative process prohibit changes in the text of the proposal after a 
very early stage in the process. Although some allow revisions to reflect advice provided by legislative 
drafters or other officials, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1809(1)(a)–(b) (2006), none allow changes 
once proponents begin to circulate petitions. In some indirect initiative processes, the proposal can be 
changed after the legislature has considered it and refused to act but before it is presented to the citizens 
for a vote. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 2, cl. V (allowing a change that is “perfecting in its 
nature and does not materially change the substance of the measure”). 
 45. Costa v. Super. Ct., 128 P.3d 149 (Cal. 2005), rev’d, 128 P.3d 675 (Cal. 2006). 
 46. Costa v. Super. Ct., 128 P.3d 675, 700 (Cal. 2006). 
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the discrepancies had not been relatively minor,47 the petitions would have 
been invalid, and the measure pulled off the ballot. In contrast, our 
framework contemplates that such substantial changes could be made after 
the policy statement qualifies because a process providing such flexibility 
is a better process than the rigid status quo. The California Supreme 
Court’s reaction is noteworthy for our purposes for another reason: the 
Court’s view of the signature gathering process mirrors ours in that the 
justices did not believe the details of the proposal played a significant role 
in a citizen’s decision to sign the petition. 
Our Dual Path Initiative Framework allows proponents to take a 
general policy proposal to the people through the petition process. Once 
initiative backers get sufficient signatures, they earn the right to move into 
the stage of second reading. Essentially, they have earned an option to 
place an initiative on the ballot to implement the policy statement. In the 
second reading period, the proposal’s language is drafted in a process that 
allows major as well as minor revisions, and the legislature plays a role in 
the process, a role that can be substantial if lawmakers decide to negotiate 
with proponents or put their own proposal on the ballot. 
B.  THE SECOND READING: DRAFTING THE TEXT AND NEGOTIATING WITH 
THE LEGISLATURE 
As is evident in Figure 1, there are two pathways through which an 
initiative can influence public policy. First, once a proposal has met the 
signature requirement, a three-month period will begin during which the 
proponents of the proposal can develop text to implement the policy 
objectives.48 Second, the legislature can submit text on the same general 
topic or otherwise reach a compromise that satisfies proponents.49  
No other group can submit an initiative related to this policy statement 
for the ballot, although presumably some competing groups may also 
 
 47. Id. (calling discrepancies between the version of the initiative measure submitted to the 
attorney general and the version circulated for signature “inadvertent”); id. at 694 (referring to 
“numerous relatively minor departures” from constitutional and statutory requirements that still 
substantially comply with applicable provisions). 
 48. Another recent scholarly proposal includes a step in the initiative process similar to ours. It 
would also allow flexibility in drafting after qualification and would provide a preelection period 
similar to notice-and-comment rulemaking in federal administrative agencies. This process would allow 
better drafting and time for compromise; it would also provide a record for subsequent judicial review. 
See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 55–59. 
 49. Because the legislature has a role in this process, the three months must overlap with a 
legislative session, a requirement that presents greater logistical challenges in states with part-time 
legislatures. 
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qualify their own general statements of policy as a response to a petition 
drive. In many cases, developing competing ballot measures is a strategy to 
defeat the first one; the competitors may not particularly care if their 
measure is enacted because their main objective is to defeat the proposal 
they oppose. In 2005, for example, pharmaceutical companies used this 
tactic to defeat a measure placed on the California ballot by consumer 
groups to provide discounts on prescription drugs.50 The main goal of 
qualifying the second measure was to defeat the first; thus, the drug 
companies were not very disappointed when both failed. In other cases, 
competing groups simply have different ways of achieving the same goal. 
In this case, either both would have to qualify policy statements to get their 
versions on the ballot, or they would have to compromise during the second 
reading period on text that fits the policy statement that has qualified and 
proceed to the ballot with a consensus proposal. To allow voters to more 
easily understand the relationship among ballot measures, related 
measures—whether put on the ballot by the legislature or by another group 
that qualified a competing policy statement—should be grouped together 
on the ballot and identified in a way that allows voters to see them as 
linked. 
Early in the second reading period, proponents will post proposed text 
on a state website to elicit suggestions, amendments, and discussion. This 
text need not be the final text but rather a proposal that is likely to change 
during this stage of the process. In addition, the legislature will be required 
to hold hearings in both houses on the proposal. Initiative proponents 
should have access to state-provided services to assist in drafting effective 
legislative language. Some states currently provide such services. For 
example, Washington’s code reviser is required to review all initiative 
proposals and provide advice to sponsors on form and language; indeed, if 
the sponsor merely submits a memo sketching out the objective and 
proposal, the staff of the code reviser will draft the legislative language.51 
 
 50. Proposition 78 on the 2005 special election ballot was sponsored by the pharmaceutical 
companies and would have created a state-run drug discount program in which the pharmaceutical 
companies could voluntarily participate. Proposition 78: Discounts on Prescription Drugs. Initiative 
Statute, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, 36–41, 
66–69 (Cal. Sec’y of State, 2005), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_ 
pdf/entire78.pdf. It was a reaction to Proposition 79, which was sponsored by consumer groups such as 
Consumers Union, AARP, and the League of Women Voters, and would have created a mandatory drug 
discount program. Proposition 79: Prescription Drug Discounts, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE: SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, 42–49, 69–72 (Cal. Sec’y of State, 2005), 
available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/entire79.pdf. 
 51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.72.020 (LexisNexis 2006). See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, 
supra note 25, at 102. 
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In Colorado, there is a mandatory public hearing on measures that will 
appear on the ballot,52 and the advice provided by experts and the public 
during this deliberation results in revisions in seventy to eighty percent of 
initiatives before petitions are circulated.53 These review periods all occur 
before the petition circulation stage; our framework would change that 
timing so that drafting and legislative resources are deployed only after a 
significant number of voters have indicated a desire to submit the policy to 
a popular vote. 
Qualifying a policy statement in the first reading period can be viewed 
as just a new way to introduce a bill into the legislative process. Once 
proponents gather the required number of signatures, they begin a process 
that involves legislative hearings and the possibility of negotiation with 
other groups and the legislature. Just as with a bill introduced in the 
traditional manner, the legislature may choose not to act, or it may revise 
the proposal significantly. Unlike other bills, however, the initiative 
proponents can choose to take their reform to the people for enactment if 
they are not satisfied with the legislative response. Given this difference, 
we may see legislators using this new route of bill introduction, as well as 
groups and individuals with the financial or human resources to mount 
successful petition campaigns. This development would be a new aspect of 
hybrid democracy as the legislative agenda would be partially set by the 
petition process, and strategic political actors would increasingly consider 
this avenue of moving an issue to the forefront of policymakers’ attention. 
1.  Time to Draft and Revise 
The flexibility provided by the second reading stage of the framework 
will result in better statutory and constitutional language. Currently, a 
scrivener’s error is sometimes identified during the petition circulation 
period or during the campaign, and drafters would be eager to amend the 
proposal to gain additional support if they had the ability to make such 
changes. For example, Governor Schwarzenegger had to take a pension 
reform initiative out of circulation in 2005 because the attorney general 
interpreted his proposal not only as changing the structure of state 
pensions, but also as abolishing death benefits for survivors of police 
 
 52. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105(1) (2006) (requiring that a 
hearing be held on each initiative submitted, before petitions are circulated). 
 53. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 102. See also WATERS, supra note 16, at 15 
(detailing similar assistance provided in other states). 
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officers and firefighters killed in the line of duty.54 Although the Governor 
contested this interpretation as one adopted by a Democratic official 
seeking to undermine his agenda,55 the current structure of direct 
democracy denied him the easy and uncontroversial response of just 
changing the language to clarify that death benefits were protected. 
Sometimes gaps in an initiative become apparent during the campaign; 
under our framework, proponents could modify their proposals to address 
such problems. For example, Proposition 71, the stem cell bond measure on 
the California ballot in November 2004, arguably contained inadequate 
conflict of interest and disclosure provisions. These concerns were raised 
during the campaign,56 providing the opportunity for amendment before the 
popular vote. This example also demonstrates that a framework providing 
this kind of flexibility may not solve all the problems of poorly worded or 
inadequately comprehensive initiatives. In this case, Robert Klein, the main 
force behind Proposition 71 and now Chair of the Independent Citizens 
Oversight Committee of the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, 
has denied the need for such provisions.57 Of course, if he had the chance 
to make changes to respond to the concerns, he might have been willing to 
do so. The position he has taken in the campaign and after his victory could 
be a function of the inflexibility of the process and his desire to ensure that 
the measure takes effect. Nonetheless, as with most framework laws, an 
initiative framework would provide the opportunity for revision; it would 
not require proponents to respond to all criticisms. It is important to leave 
the decisions about changes to a ballot measure in the hands of the 
proponents, even though they may resist beneficial changes. Empowering 
state officials or legislators to change the language of an initiative 
undermines the reason for direct democracy in the first place—to 
circumvent entrenched political players who may be motivated by self-
interest or influenced by special interests at a cost to the public interest. 
 
 54. See Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Secretary of State McPherson Reports Three Proposed 
Initiatives Enter Circulation 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/press_releases/2005/ 
05_037.pdf (providing the attorney general’s official title and summary of the “Prohibition Against 
Defined Benefit Public Pensions. Exception for University of California. Initiative Constitutional 
Amendment and Statute.”). 
 55. See Robert Salladay, Lockyer Is Accused of Stacking Deck Against Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 56. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Big Science, Big Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at A18; 
Jonathan Knight, Critics Slate Ethical Leeway in California Stem-cell Proposal, NATURE, Sept. 16, 
2004, at 232. 
 57. Klein has said that voters approved the initiative “with their eyes open” and that “[t]he 
institute needs time to go through the process” and “have thoughtful due diligence.” Bernadette Tansey, 
Stem Cell Program in Limbo; Hayward Judge Reviewing Lawsuits that Block Research, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 18, 2005, at C1; Carl T. Hall, Stem Cells: The $3 Billion Bet, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 2005, at A1. 
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As advocates consider the best way to implement the policy objective, 
they also have an opportunity to build support for their proposal by 
involving other groups in the drafting. In this way, the initiative process 
can incorporate some aspects of the traditional legislative process where 
tradeoffs can be made and compromises can be reached. The scope of any 
logrolling will be limited by both the breadth of the general policy 
statement and the requirement that the text voted on by the people fairly fit 
within the objectives it set out. We also envision that states will retain the 
single subject requirement58 under this new framework, a restriction that 
further constrains the scope of negotiations and compromise. 
The second reading stage promises other systemic benefits. More 
drafting flexibility before the vote may reduce litigation after election day, 
which often revolves around awkward wording. Moreover, the discussion 
that will accompany the decision to amend an initiative’s language and the 
record from legislative hearings provides courts with helpful evidence to 
interpret vague or ambiguous language in subsequent lawsuits.59 Requiring 
a second reading in the initiative process may reduce the use of crypto-
initiatives for which policy change is at best a secondary consideration.60 
The need to negotiate with legislators before an initiative is actually placed 
on the ballot may reduce the purely political use of initiatives. Also, the 
information developed during this period can better inform those providing 
fiscal analyses of the initiatives. Importantly, unlike the indirect initiative 
in many states, the legislature cannot unilaterally deny proponents access to 
the ballot by passing an alternative formulation. In our Dual Path Initiative 
Framework, the proponents always have the option to put their reform on 
the ballot, even if the legislature has responded with a statute or a 
constitutional ballot measure. 
2.  A Formal Role for the Legislature 
The second reading stage also formalizes an appropriate role for the 
legislature in analyzing the policy, drafting legislative or constitutional 
language, and negotiating with the supporters of the initiative. Mandatory 
legislative hearings provide the avenue for the first two aspects of 
 
 58. For a discussion of the single subject requirement in the context of initiatives, see Daniel H. 
Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002). 
 59. For a discussion of how courts find “legislative intent” for initiatives, see Jane S. Schacter, 
The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 114–
23 (1995). 
 60. See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 969–74 (discussing the rise of crypto-initiatives). 
For a further discussion of the likely equilibrium after the adoption of the Dual Path Initiative 
Framework, see Part V, infra. 
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legislative activity and set the stage for negotiations if lawmakers are 
interested in bargaining. 
It is likely that at least some initiative advocates will be willing to 
explore legislative alternatives because they currently use ballot measures 
to gain leverage in the legislature. Initiative proponents often prefer to 
avoid an election, which is costly and risky. Even if their change is 
constitutional and thus necessitates a vote, ballot measures backed by the 
legislature pass at significantly higher rates than do popular initiatives.61 
Accordingly, initiative proponents hope that the credible threat of ballot 
victory encourages legislative leaders to work out a mutually agreeable 
compromise. Currently, if a compromise is reached before signatures have 
to be filed with the California Secretary of State, there is no difficulty 
because the supporters can decide not to turn the petitions in. The 
complication arises when a compromise comes after the signatures have 
been verified and the question certified for the ballot. In most states, 
proponents cannot pull a question from the ballot once it is certified.62  
This inflexibility can cause confusion if the compromise requires the 
legislature to submit a different but related question to the people. Then the 
ballot contains two incompatible measures, and the parties to the deal have 
to specify to voters which measure they should vote for and which one they 
should ignore or vote against. In some cases, this message can be 
successfully conveyed. For example, in 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger 
hammered out an agreement with local government officials that allowed 
him to get a budget through the legislature. In return for the local leaders’ 
support, the legislature put Proposition 1A on the ballot to amend the 
Constitution to protect, somewhat, local governments’ property tax and 
sales tax proceeds from state raids in the future.63 To increase the 
 
 61. In California, 65% of legislative initiatives pass, while around a third of popular initiatives 
succeed at the polls. Bruce E. Cain, Sara Ferejohn, Margarita Najar & Mary Walther, Constitutional 
Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our State Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, 
supra note 24, at 265, 269. See also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 197 (1989) (providing similar national figures); DAVID B. 
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 107 
(1984) (providing voters’ self-reported drop-off for ballot propositions by demographic category). 
 62. Most states limit the ability of proponents to withdraw the ballot measures after signatures 
have been submitted or verified. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(A) (1999). South Dakota, however, 
allows proponents to withdraw an initiative if the election is at least 120 days away, and if at least two-
thirds of the named sponsors request withdrawal, in writing, with the secretary of state. S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 2-1-2.2 (2003). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-134 (2006) (allowing proponents to pull a 
measure from the ballot no later than thirty-three days before the election). 
 63. See Tom Chorneau & Doug Haberman, Local Officials Seek End to State Raids on Funds, 
PRESS ENTERPRISE, Oct. 25, 2004, at A6; Proposition 1A: Protection of Local Government Revenues, 
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likelihood that the governor and legislators would deal with them, local 
governments had already qualified Proposition 65 for the November ballot, 
which would have much more severely limited the ability of the state to use 
these revenues in an emergency.64 Once a deal was reached, the local 
governments dropped their support of Proposition 65 and joined the 
campaign for Proposition 1A, but both measures still appeared on the ballot 
in November.65 
In this case, the compromise passed and the initiative used as a threat 
in the bargaining did not. But it surely would have been simpler and less 
confusing had the supporters of Proposition 65 been allowed to remove that 
measure from the ballot. If our framework had been in place, these 
negotiations would have occurred in the second reading stage, and only the 
compromise constitutional amendment would have appeared on the ballot. 
When a statutory compromise is sufficient to satisfy all the parties, then 
nothing needs to be taken to the people after a successful bargain.  
The second reading stage encourages negotiation and compromise 
with the legislature in other ways. Not only does the legislature necessarily 
become involved as it conducts mandatory hearings on the proposal, but 
also the legislature has leverage to encourage initiative supporters to deal 
with it. Our framework permits both the legislature and the group 
qualifying the policy to place initiatives on the same topic on the ballot. If 
no mutually acceptable compromise is reached, then the legislature has the 
right to place its own measure on the ballot. Our framework does not limit 
the legislature to achieving policy goals identified in the statement that had 
been circulated; rather, the legislature can put any initiative on the ballot, as 
it can under current law. Thus, the legislature has the flexibility to achieve 
the objective identified in the policy statement but in a different way—or to 
achieve a different and perhaps incompatible objective. The state may use 
its power to cause enough confusion to result in the defeat of both 
proposals, or it may actually succeed in passing its ballot measure. The 
 
reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: SUPPLEMENTAL 4–9 (Cal. Sec’y of State, 2004), 
available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/supplemental/vig_sup_1a_entire.pdf. 
 64. See Proposition 65: Local Government Funds, Revenues. State Mandates. Initiative 
Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 10–15 (Cal. Sec’y of 
State, 2004), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/supplemental/vig_sup_65_ 
entire.pdf (requiring voter approval for any reduction of local governments’ vehicle license fee 
revenues, sales tax revenues, or share of local property taxes). 
 65. See id. at 14–15 (providing no argument in favor of Proposition 65 and urging voters to pass 
Proposition 1A, “a new and better measure . . . to prevent state raids on local government funding”). 
Proposition 1A passed with 84% of the vote; Proposition 65 was handily defeated. CAL. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 2, 2004, STATE BALLOT MEASURES, STATEWIDE 
RETURNS (2004), available at http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm. 
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California legislature used this strategy in 2004 to defeat an initiative 
proposing nonpartisan primaries. Instead, voters passed a legislatively 
initiated ballot measure amending the constitution to allow political parties 
control over their own primaries, essentially a codification of the status 
quo.66 
Initiative proponents also have some clout in this bargaining game. As 
we have noted, they can walk away from any bargain and take their 
proposal directly to the people for enactment. If they choose that route and 
succeed, then the CIIOC will play a role in the implementation of the 
initiative.67 If the legislature wishes to avoid the possibility of involvement 
by the CIIOC in the future, then lawmakers will have to reach a deal that 
proponents support. Thus, each side has reasons to bargain with the other, 
and our framework changes the bargaining dynamics in significant ways 
relative to the status quo. It also provides additional information to voters, 
who can learn of the legislature’s response to any initiative proposal. 
Indeed, even the decision not to bargain or respond to the proposal beyond 
the mandated hearings provides credible information to voters.68 
3.  Certifying the Text for the Ballot 
At the end of the second reading stage, when initiative sponsors 
propose final text, the CIIOC will determine whether the text fits fairly 
within the scope of the general policy that appeared on the petition. The 
CIIOC has the option of certifying the initiative for the ballot, severing 
provisions that are beyond the scope of the policy statement, or 
disqualifying the entire initiative as inconsistent with the statement. There 
should be expedited appeals of a CIIOC decision through the state courts. 
We advocate this role for the CIIOC, and not the attorney general or 
secretary of state who has similar responsibilities now, because a state 
official, likely hostile to any initiative that has not been embraced by the 
 
 66. The legislature-sponsored proposal was Proposition 60, which was placed on the ballot to 
react to Proposition 62, the nonpartisan primary initiative. See Proposition 60: Election Rights of 
Political Parties. Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE 16–19 (Cal. Sec’y of State, 2004), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/ 
prop_60_entire.pdf; Proposition 62: Elections. Primaries. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and 
Statute, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 28–31 (Cal. Sec’y of State, 2004), available 
at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_62_entire.pdf. Proposition 60 passed overwhelmingly 
with 68% of the vote, while Proposition 62 failed (only 46% in favor). CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTES 
FOR AND AGAINST STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES (2004), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ 
sov/2004_general/sov_pref21_votes_for_and_against.pdf. 
 67. See infra Part IV (discussing the CIIOC). 
 68. See infra Part V (discussing the possible equilibrium outcome of no negotiation between 
proponents and the legislature). 
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established political actors, may not rule fairly on the ballot measures. 
Current rules allowing the legislature to place initiatives on the ballot 
would remain in place, so the legislature can put its own competing 
proposal on the ballot in cases where no compromise is reached. In that 
event, the CIIOC will provide a statement about how the legislative 
proposal fits, if at all, with the goals of the original policy statement. 
Our framework injects a new issue into any initiative campaign. 
Opponents may argue that the version submitted to the voters diverges 
from the policy statement that was circulated for signatures. This argument 
may influence people to vote against the initiative either because it is not 
what they originally supported or because this sort of strategic behavior 
casts doubt on the motives and honesty of the proponents. Anticipating this 
kind of attack, proponents are more likely to draft straightforward and 
relatively clear text so that concerned voters can check the language and 
assess the accuracy of campaign claims. Simplicity will not always be a 
tactic available to proponents; some reforms are necessarily complicated. 
But, on the whole, we expect that our framework will improve transparency 
in the text of initiatives. 
The bargaining during the second reading period may involve 
logrolling between initiative supporters and legislators that, in some cases, 
will result in deals that “buy off” the initiative supporters without 
instituting meaningful reform along the lines described in the policy 
statement. Some of these deals may be welfare-reducing for society as a 
whole although beneficial to the leaders of the initiative drive. When such a 
deal is embodied in a statute, there are no safeguards other than those in the 
traditional legislative process to bring attention to the compromise. 
However, when the deal requires a popular vote to enact it because it is part 
of a constitutional change, the framework provides several protections. 
First, in the description of a legislatively backed constitutional ballot 
measure, the CIIOC should identify any side deal that deviates from the 
purported policy objectives. This description, produced by an entity that is 
not a party to any bargain, will make dubious compromises more 
transparent to the press, opponents of the initiative, and voters. Second, as 
described above, the campaign will likely include discussions of whether 
the measure on the ballot is really the same reform that qualified during the 
first stage of the framework. This dynamic makes it more difficult for 
proponents to slip in special provisions benefiting them or their allies, or 
for the legislature and proponents to include side deals in the text submitted 
for a vote. Logrolling will certainly occur—as it occasionally does now in 
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the initiative process69—but our framework provides sufficient checks and 
balances to make the deals salient to voters. 
Even with these changes in the process of proposing and drafting 
initiatives, we expect some to contain mistakes or to cause consequences 
not fully understood when they were enacted. After all, even with many 
vetogates, expert staff, and time for deliberation in the traditional 
legislature, some statutes are poorly written, hastily conceived, and prone 
to unanticipated consequences.70 Thus, the third reading stage of our 
framework focuses on the ability to revise popularly enacted laws and 
constitutional amendments after they are passed. 
C.  THIRD READING: ALLOWING REVISION AFTER ENACTMENT 
The issue of post-enactment change to initiatives must be resolved 
differently for statutory initiatives and constitutional initiatives. In every 
state that allows popularly generated constitutional amendments, a 
subsequent popular vote is required to amend or repeal such an initiative. 
Statutory initiatives, on the other hand, are more amenable to subsequent 
revision. All states except California allow legislatures some latitude to 
modify statutory initiatives; in California, statutory initiatives are insulated 
from subsequent legislative involvement unless such involvement is 
specifically authorized by the initiative itself.71 A few states prohibit repeal, 
at least for the first few years the statutory initiative is effective.72 Other 
states require supermajority legislative votes to amend or repeal popularly 
 
 69. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure 
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 314–15 (2005) (describing logrolling engaged in by 
Gerald Meral, president of the nonprofit Planning and Conservation League Foundation, in California, 
to determine which projects would be included in a bond measure on the November 2002 ballot). 
 70. John Copeland Nagle observes that the legislature sometimes fails to take advantage of 
vetogates in his interesting piece comparing initiatives with hastily enacted statutes. John Copeland 
Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 170–81 
(1997). Certainly, we do not want to compare an ideal legislative process with a realistic, or even 
cynical, view of direct democracy. But our point is that the legislative process provides checks and 
balances—including the executive’s veto power—that the initiative process simply lacks. Our goal is to 
suggest additional checks for the latter process, in the hope that they will be used to improve policy but 
with awareness that they will not be foolproof. 
 71. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It 
may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved 
by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”). 
 72. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2, cl. 3 (“An initiative measure so approved by the voters 
shall not be amended, annulled, repealed, set aside or suspended by the legislature within 3 years from 
the date it takes effect.”); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f) (“An initiated law . . . may not be repealed by the 
legislature within two (2) years of its effective date. It may be amended at any time.”). 
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enacted laws,73 and Arizona requires that any amendment further the 
purposes of the initiative and be passed by three-fourths votes in both 
houses.74 We will discuss the framework for statutory initiatives first and 
then deal with the harder issue of revision of more durable constitutional 
initiatives. Our focus is on initiatives that are placed on the ballot by 
individuals and groups, not by the legislature. Legislatively backed 
constitutional initiatives have navigated through the checks and balances in 
the legislative process and thus do not require the additional check of the 
third reading stage. 
1.  Statutory Initiatives 
Under our proposed framework, some proposals for statutory changes 
qualified in the first reading stage will never appear on the ballot because a 
successful negotiation with the legislature culminates in the enactment of a 
compromise through the traditional legislative process. Some proponents, 
however, will not be satisfied with the legislature’s response and will place 
their statute on the ballot. Unlike the current regime in California, the 
initiative framework should allow legislative repeal and amendment of 
such statutory initiatives with the following limitations. First, repeal by 
two-thirds vote of the legislature should be possible, but only after two 
years of experience with the initiative. Second, a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature should be required for amendments, which must further the 
objectives of the popularly enacted law.  
Some protection from the legislature is required; lawmakers can be 
hostile to initiatives, which are often used to circumvent the traditional 
process to enact policy. We thus allow repeal but limit amendments to 
those consistent with the purpose of the law. This design better ensures 
accountability for lawmakers who seek to undermine the statute. If they 
want to negate the law, they must do so directly by repeal, not through 
amendments that gut the proposal surreptitiously while still leaving it on 
the books. This latter course of action is much more likely to occur without 
the public’s knowledge, whereas outright repeal is apt to be noticed. 
 
 73. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (“No measure approved by a vote of the people shall be 
amended or repealed by the General Assembly . . . except upon a yea and nay vote on roll call of two-
thirds of all the members elected to each house of the General Assembly . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 8 
(“A measure approved by the electors may not be repealed or amended by the legislative assembly for 
seven years from its effective date, except by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.”). 
 74. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 6(C); WATERS, supra note 16, at 27. Arizona also 
prohibits repeal of an initiative by the legislature. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 6(B). 
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One problem with this solution is that supporters of the law must 
remain vigilant in monitoring the amendments passed by the legislature and 
challenging those they believe are inconsistent with the law’s purposes. 
Grassroots groups sponsoring an initiative often do not remain organized or 
funded past the campaign, and even those that remain somewhat active 
may not have the resources to mount judicial challenges. In this case, 
money will remain influential because only those groups with long-term 
organizations and sufficient funds will be able to protect their initiatives 
from legislative meddling. We will suggest one solution to this problem 
later: the CIIOC will keep track of legislative involvement with statutory 
initiatives. It will also have standing to bring lawsuits to challenge 
amendments that commissioners believe incompatible with the initiative’s 
purposes. We note that the oversight commission will focus only on 
statutes passed through the initiative process, not on compromises enacted 
through the legislature. The possibility of ongoing oversight may 
encourage some reformers to pursue the initiative route if they fear 
legislators and other state officials may not implement a compromise, and 
the specter of oversight may encourage the legislature to offer an attractive 
compromise to proponents. 
2.  Constitutional Initiatives 
Currently, many initiatives are constitutional amendments and thus 
cannot be changed by the legislature, but only by a subsequent popular 
vote. If an initiative framework makes statutory initiatives more susceptible 
to legislative tinkering, presumably the number of constitutional initiatives 
relative to statutory ones will increase. Although constitutional initiatives 
usually require more signatures for ballot access, few states require higher 
voting thresholds to pass constitutional initiatives (a simple majority of 
those voting is the typical requirement for enactment of any type of 
initiative).75 Groups with sufficient resources find obtaining the additional 
signatures relatively unproblematic, although more expensive, and thus 
often choose the more durable constitutional route rather than the statutory 
form, in states where they have a choice.76 
 
 75. Nevada requires that initiative constitutional amendments pass by a majority vote in two 
successive general elections. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2, cl. 4; WATERS, supra note 16, at 26. See also 
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., REP. 2006-3, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2006), 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%202006-3%20Amendments.pdf (detailing other deviations 
from the requirement of a simple majority to pass). 
 76. In states that allow both constitutional and statutory initiatives, there have been slightly more 
statutory initiatives placed on the ballot through the petition process than constitutional initiatives. Data 
from the Initiative and Referendum Almanac reveal that 703 constitutional amendments have appeared 
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We propose that any constitutional initiative proposed entirely through 
the petition process, rather than placed on the ballot by legislatures, should 
require popular reauthorization after a certain period of time. Either the 
legislature can resubmit the initiative to the people, or proponents can again 
gather signatures to place it on the ballot for extension. Constitutional 
provisions passed as initiatives should be subject to a one-time reapproval 
after ten years.77 Although this seems a relatively long period of time, we 
believe at least a decade of experience is necessary for some initiatives to 
produce a record necessary to evaluate them fairly. For example, initiatives 
that affect structures of representation such as redistricting and campaign 
finance reform must be in place for at least a decade or they will expire 
before they can have any significant impact on governance. In addition, 
there is a cost to reauthorizing initiatives. The framework applies to all 
initiatives; therefore, even those that enhance welfare will expire and 
require reenactment. Finally, a long enough period of implementation is 
needed to encourage people to continue to use the initiative process; it is 
not our intention to construct a framework that destroys direct democracy 
by making initiatives so unattractive that no one will spend time qualifying 
and passing them. Ten years is the period of time that we think balances the 
costs and benefits of reduced durability. 
Although one could argue that constitutional initiatives passed by a 
landslide, say by three-fourths of those voting on the measure, should not 
face reauthorization, Kousser and McCubbins’s analysis suggests that 
politicians construct some welfare-reducing initiatives to face little 
opposition. Thus, these initiatives might be enacted by a substantial margin, 
in an environment that undermines the ability of voters to vote 
competently.78 Therefore, no special treatment should be afforded to 
initiatives on the basis of their popularity on election day. 
For popular initiatives that expire and are not placed on the ballot by 
the legislature for permanent enactment, fewer signatures will be required 
for reauthorization to gain ballot access than were required initially. 
Because part of the rationale for a one-time reauthorization requirement is 
to allow constitutional initiatives to be modified to reflect experience with 
the law, proponents will qualify for the reduced signature threshold even if 
 
on the ballot in the eleven states that allow both direct constitutional and statutory initiatives, while 758 
statutory amendments have qualified. This data covers the period from the beginning of the initiative 
process in the United States through 2000. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 12 and passim. 
 77. For a discussion of the effects of requiring traditional legislation to expire, including some 
similar to those we discuss here in the context of initiatives, see Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary 
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 78. Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 957–60. 
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the measure is slightly different from the original enactment. This may 
necessitate some judgment calls by the official certifying the petitions for 
circulation, but the general rule should be that changes furthering the 
purpose of the measure will be allowed without triggering the higher 
signature thresholds. The process for placing the initiative on the ballot will 
include the two reading periods described above to allow an opportunity for 
evaluation of the experience with the provision and to encourage revisions 
that improve its operation. 
We anticipate many constitutional initiatives will be extended either 
by legislative action or through requalification. Once a law has been in 
effect, new interest groups often form as a result of the law, and they may 
join the original supporters to advocate for reenactment. In addition, groups 
will often work harder to retain a benefit than to obtain it in the first place. 
But the one-time reauthorization allows for modification of the proposal to 
adjust to developments that were unanticipated when the initiative was 
passed or to account for changed circumstances. Moreover, proponents will 
still need to convince a majority of voters to support the proposal again on 
election day, even if the threshold for ballot access is somewhat reduced. 
Once reauthorized, however, the initiative becomes permanent until 
repealed by another initiative or constitutional revision. 
IV.  A FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INITIATIVES: A CITIZENS OVERSIGHT COMMISSION 
The checks and balances provided by our Dual Path Initiative 
Framework do not explicitly address the concern that legislatures often 
flaunt or simply ignore the mandates of an initiative. This is called the 
“implementation problem,”79 and it occurs because initiative proponents 
have to delegate to others the responsibility to implement and enforce the 
initiative once it has been passed. Because the initiative process is a costly 
way to circumvent the traditional lawmaking process, it tends to result in 
policies that elected officials—often a large majority of them—do not like 
or support.80 Otherwise, reformers would have used the route of traditional 
lawmaking. Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins identify two groups of post-
enactment actors vital to the initiative’s success: “implementation leaders” 
who provide instructions for compliance (for example, state legislators who 
often must pass implementing legislation), and “implementation agents” 
who carry out those directions (for example, bureaucrats who oversee the 
 
 79. Lupia & Matsusaka, supra note 1, at 475. 
 80. Gerber et al., The Politics of Implementation, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
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day-to-day governmental activities required by the initiative and any 
subsequent instructions).81 Not only are both these groups likely to be 
hostile to the initiative’s objectives, but also initiative supporters often 
disband after their victory or lack the resources to monitor compliance and 
sanction noncompliance. For greater compliance, we need to create a third 
group—call them “implementation intervenors”82—whose interests are 
more closely aligned with the proponents and the voters. We propose to 
create such a group by establishing a statewide CIIOC. 
A.  DESIGN OF THE CIIOC 
To reduce the ability of initiative leaders and agents to disregard 
popular measures that the voters approve, we advocate establishing a 
CIIOC, comprised of members appointed through the initiative process. 
Each initiative will name a representative to the CIIOC, who will take 
office if the measure passes. The primary role of the CIIOC will be to 
oversee the actions of the implementation leaders and agents; provide 
information on compliance with initiatives through hearings, press 
conferences, and publications; and bring enforcement actions through the 
courts and administrative procedures. It is first and foremost an oversight 
mechanism, a component of a “fire alarm” network that will provide 
information to the public about each initiative and its implementation.83 It 
is an additional intervenor designed to enhance the chances of 
implementation; it will not replace current mechanisms like lawsuits, other 
enforcement actions, and publicity resulting from the efforts of private 
individuals or groups.  
The CIIOC will have oversight jurisdiction with respect to initiatives 
placed on the ballot by petition, but not with respect to measures put before 
the people by the legislature, even if the original motivation was a petition 
qualified during the first reading period of our framework. The rationale for 
the CIIOC is that initiatives most likely to be resisted by implementation 
leaders and agents need additional resources to ensure compliance; if the 
 
 81. Id. at 47. 
 82. Cf. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264–66 (1987) (describing intervenors in 
the legislative and administrative processes). 
 83. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (arguing that “fire-alarm” oversight, 
which involves little direct intervention by Congress into executive agency activities, is likely to be 
more effective, on balance, than “police patrol” oversight, which is comparatively centralized, active, 
and direct). 
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measure was ultimately supported by the legislature, there is less 
justification for this new form of oversight. 
The CIIOC and its staff could play additional roles in the Dual Path 
Initiative Framework. For example, we noted previously that the CIIOC 
could determine whether the text of an initiative submitted to the voters 
after the second reading period conformed to the policy statement that had 
been qualified in the signature gathering stage. Additionally, the CIIOC 
could release a statement describing how any measure placed on the ballot 
by the legislature related to an earlier policy statement. There are other 
opportunities to use the CIIOC, rather than an elected or appointed official 
who may have a conflict of interest with respect to a ballot measure, to 
make crucial decisions. The CIIOC could play a role in determining 
whether a constitutional initiative submitted for popular reauthorization 
after a decade of experience is sufficiently related to the previously enacted 
initiative to be considered a reauthorization rather than a new policy. 
Although the CIIOC provides an alternate decisionmaker to political actors 
apt to be generally hostile to initiatives, the Commission should be used for 
purposes other than oversight only when necessary. The oversight role will 
demand significant attention and resources from the commissioners and 
their staff, and it should remain the central focus of the CIIOC. 
We are not aware of any similar initiative oversight commission with 
jurisdiction over all popularly initiated ballot measures. Some statewide 
and local initiatives establish oversight commissions with responsibilities 
only with regard to the particular initiative creating them. For example, the 
Political Reform Act enacted by statutory initiative in California in 1974 
established the Fair Political Practices Commission (“FPPC”) with five 
members, appointed by the governor, attorney general, secretary of state, 
and controller, to oversee and administer the Act.84 The 2004 stem cell 
initiative established a California Institute for Regenerative Medicine to 
regulate research and to administer the grants. The twenty-nine members of 
the Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee that runs the Institute are 
appointed by various elected officials and the chancellors of some of the 
University of California universities.85 Other states have similar initiative-
specific oversight commissions, such as the Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission established in Arizona as part of the public campaign 
 
 84. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100–83102 (West 2005). 
 85. CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, §§ 1–7; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125290.10–.20 (West 
2006). 
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financing system,86 and the Citizens’ Utility Board established by a 1932 
initiative in Oregon.87  
Local initiatives also can create citizens commissions designed to 
monitor compliance with the particular ballot measure. For example, an 
initiative passed in Marin County, California in June 2006 established a 
Citizens Oversight Commission to ensure that money from an education 
bond was spent according to the terms of the ballot measure. The 
Commission is appointed by the Board of Trustees of the school district, 
however, undermining the proponents’ claims that it would be independent. 
These provisions of the ballot measure were explicitly designed to respond 
to the implementation problem: the opponents’ arguments against the 
measure began with a recitation of past promises related to educational 
infrastructure that politicians had repeatedly broken.88  
Some of these initiative-specific commissions also function as the 
implementation leader or agent, such as the FPPC that promulgates 
regulations and brings enforcement actions against those who violate ethics 
or campaign rules. Others, such as the local oversight commission for the 
education bond, are purely initiative intervenors charged with auditing the 
behavior of leaders and agents and publicizing any noncompliance. 
The CIIOC eliminates the need for separate oversight commissions at 
the state level and replaces them with one well-staffed and permanent 
commission.89 Each statewide initiative will be required to name one 
representative to serve on the CIIOC if the initiative is enacted.90 This 
 
 86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-955(A) (Supp. 2005). 
 87. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 774.010–.990 (2005). 
 88. For the arguments that appeared in the Marin county ballot pamphlet for and against this 
measure, see MARIN REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, MEASURE STATEMENTS JUNE 6, 2006, REBUTTAL TO 
ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE A (2006), available at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/ 
RV/main/Prime60606/Measures/21-554.pdf; MARIN REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, MEASURE STATEMENTS 
JUNE 6, 2006, ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE A (2006), available at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/ 
RV/Main/Prime60606/Measures/21-555.pdf. 
 89. Initiatives might still set up initiative-specific agencies to implement the new policy; the 
CIIOC does not eliminate the need for such administrative agencies. However, because many of these 
are appointed by elected officials, the CIIOC should improve compliance in such cases because the 
appointed officials may have preferences more aligned with those who appointed them than with the 
voters or initiative proponents. 
 90. Thus, the number of commissioners will fluctuate as the number of initiatives fluctuates. 
Commissioners will be part-time positions, with compensation for expenses and perhaps a very modest 
honorarium. As initiatives conflict, so might the commissioners, but this conflict is just a reflection of 
state politics and the decisions of the voters in passing conflicting initiatives. The commission then 
provides another forum for these conflicts to be made public and explicit and to be brought to a 
resolution. We object to a commission run by experts, such as former legislators or judges, who are 
often part of the problem being addressed by an initiative. The commission may not need to meet very 
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representative will serve one ten-year term in the case of constitutional 
initiatives, or, in the case of statutory initiatives, one ten-year term or until 
the initiative is repealed, whichever is shorter. Each initiative will also 
name a group of potential replacements for the representative in case the 
representative does not serve the full ten-year term.91 The CIIOC will 
randomly select from that group of replacements when the need to fill a 
vacancy occurs.92 If none of the replacements is willing to serve, or the 
initiative fails to name replacements, then the vacancy will not be filled.93 
This method of selection ensures that the interests of the commissioners 
will be more aligned with the voters and proponents of the reform, allowing 
their objectives to remain in play for at least a decade. It also avoids the 
specter of elected officials nominating people to the commission who are 
likely not to be sufficiently supportive of the popularly enacted laws and 
constitutional amendments. 
To establish the CIIOC immediately, members from current initiative-
specific commissions will be randomly selected to serve terms staggered to 
end as the CIIOC begins to be filled by representatives of initiatives passed 
after its creation. Thus, in California, the CIIOC might first be formed with 
a representative from the FPPC, the stem cell Independent Citizen’s 
Oversight Committee, the Children and Families First Commission,94 and 
 
often but should meet and publish reports on implementation each fall and will meet to approve the 
language of new initiatives as needed. The commission should meet as often as needed by 
circumstances and should have a budget large enough to allow a sufficient number of meetings. One 
reader of an earlier draft worried that the CIIOC will encourage a new kind of crypto-initiative, 
symbolic ballot measures designed only to pack the CIIOC with allies of a particular group or 
movement. We think it unlikely that many would be willing to spend the resources necessary to qualify 
and enact enough ballot measures to capture the CIIOC. We also anticipate that the reading periods in 
the Dual Path Initiative Framework will work to reduce the number of crypto-initiatives, identify any 
that are designed purely for questionable purposes, and publicize that aspect of any proposal. Moreover, 
the legislature has the opportunity during the second reading period to co-opt a proposal and eliminate 
the possibility of CIIOC involvement. Thus, although this sort of commission-packing behavior is 
theoretically possible, we do not anticipate that it will occur much, if at all, in practice. Cf. Christopher 
S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election 
Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1407–14 (2005) (discussing commission-packing in a related context). 
 91. Like the FPPC, commissioners would be removable by the governor, with the concurrence of 
the Senate, for “substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, inability to discharge the powers 
and duties of office . . . after written notice and an opportunity for a reply.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 83105 
(West 2005). 
 92. For a recent use of random selection as part of a political process, see George A. Papandreou, 
Opinion, Picking Candidates by the Numbers, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 8, 2006, at 8 (discussing how 
Greece’s Socialist Party revived the ancient Athenian practice of deliberative democracy to select its 
candidates in municipal elections). 
 93. The ability to fill a vacancy on the commission reflects how much people care about the 
implementation of an initiative. 
 94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130110 (West 2006). 
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other similar initiative-created commissions that act in whole or in part as 
implementation intervenors. After five to seven years, all these members 
will have rotated off the CIIOC, replaced by representatives of newly 
enacted initiatives. 
The CIIOC will elect one member to serve as chair for a two-year 
term; no chair can serve more than three terms. The commission will make 
decisions by majority vote of the members present when there is a quorum 
of a majority of eligible commissioners. A commissioner cannot also hold 
any other elected or appointed political office at the federal, state, or local 
level, although commissioners can participate in campaigns and other 
partisan political activity. Commissioners will be subject to aggressive 
disclosure laws so their political activities are publicized and any potential 
conflicts of interest known. Recusal policies consistent with a citizens 
oversight commission such as the CIIOC will be developed by the state’s 
political practices and ethics commission. 
The CIIOC will employ an executive director, a legal counsel, a 
director of communications, a director of research, a director of 
information services and technology, and other appropriate professional 
staff. The compensation and the budget will be tied to another state 
administrative agency’s budget, such as the Legislative Analysts Office, 
and increased automatically according to the number of initiatives overseen 
and by changes in the cost of living. This mechanism avoids the possibility 
that the legislature will hamstring the CIIOC by denying it funding. Thus, 
in California, the funding structure could be similar to the one governing 
the FPPC: the FPPC chair is paid the same salary as the president of the 
Public Utilities Commission, other commissioners receive a modest 
honorarium for each day they are engaged in official duties,95 and the 
budget of the FPPC is set by law and increases automatically by the cost of 
living.96 
Although the CIIOC will be given enforcement authority beyond the 
ability to hold hearings, it is not necessarily the case that it will bring 
substantial numbers of lawsuits or other enforcement actions for at least 
four reasons. First, legislators and bureaucrats will be aware of the CIIOC 
and its power and will alter their behavior to take account of the increased 
probability of sanctions. The CIIOC can threaten sanctions through 
hearings and publicity, saving the possibility of more intrusive enforcement 
actions if publicity is not sufficient to increase compliance. In other words, 
 
 95. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 83106 (West 2005). 
 96. Id. § 83122. 
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the mere existence of the CIIOC will change the political game surrounding 
initiative compliance, increasing the willingness of leaders and agents to 
implement the initiative more fully. Although this threat may not be 
sufficient to ensure complete compliance, few laws are fully enforced, and 
the CIIOC may decide it is content with the level of enforcement that it 
observes. This behavioral change will also be influenced by the increased 
likelihood that citizens or interest groups will challenge lackadaisical 
enforcement, encouraged by the information produced by the CIIOC 
through hearings and reports. 
Second, although the CIIOC will have a budget that cannot be 
eliminated or reduced by lawmakers, it will not have an unlimited budget. 
Thus, it will have to make choices about how to deploy resources. It will 
have to prioritize, choosing only publicity as an enforcement method in 
some cases, bringing lawsuits and other proceedings in others, and 
choosing to do nothing in still others. 
Third, the CIIOC will include a wide range of viewpoints among its 
members. The members will have in common only their use of the 
initiative process and will not necessarily share policy or other ideological 
goals. Thus, any decision to pursue enforcement will be the result of 
compromise among CIIOC commissioners, who will strike bargains and 
make strategic decisions like any other collective entity in politics. This 
requirement of collective action among relatively diverse members acts as 
an internal check and balance on the activity of the CIIOC. 
Finally, initiative sponsors, knowing that continuing oversight by the 
CIIOC will occur, are likely to use more general language when they draft 
initiatives than they do now because they will trust the CIIOC as their agent 
more than they trust the legislature or bureaucrats. Vague language 
increases the uncertainty about any outcome of litigation or agency 
enforcement, a factor the CIIOC will take account of when deciding how to 
deploy its resources. Of course, initiative sponsors can also predict this 
effect and thus will presumably work in the second reading stage to 
produce somewhat more specific language that will strengthen the position 
of the CIIOC. The ability to specify fully, however, is limited for a variety 
of reasons.97 Thus, the CIIOC will nearly always face some possibility of 
losing when it seeks to enforce its view of the initiative, and this will affect 
its willingness to bring action in the first place. 
 
 97. For a discussion of the reasons initiatives use vague language now, see Gerber et al., The 
Politics of Implementation, supra note 4, at 58. 
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We anticipate that the CIIOC will be popular with the voters. Various 
kinds of citizens assemblies are an increasingly attractive solution to 
political problems caused when entrenched political actors pursue their 
self-interest at the expense of the public interest—or are perceived to be 
doing so. For example, a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform in 
British Columbia, Canada, consisting of 160 citizens selected randomly 
from the province’s electoral districts, conducted fifty hearings on electoral 
reform in 2004.98 With the help of an expert staff, these ordinary citizens 
proposed changing the system of representation from first-past-the-post, 
single-member districts to a single transferable vote system.99 The proposal 
was submitted to the people in a referendum. To pass, the referendum had 
to receive both a supermajority of 60% of all those voting and a simple 
majority in 60% of the seventy-nine electoral districts. The referendum 
failed, but it only barely missed the threshold: it received over 57% support 
and achieved a simple majority in all but two districts.100 A similar citizens 
assembly has been proposed in California to consider election reform.101 
Although these citizens assemblies are law-proposing bodies and thus serve 
a function different from the CIIOC’s, and their members are selected in 
different ways,102 such assemblies reflect the current enthusiasm for 
mechanisms that facilitate increased citizen involvement in policymaking. 
Moreover, they demonstrate the reality that institutional innovation is 
necessary to deal with inevitable conflicts of interest when laws regulating 
the political process would otherwise be crafted or implemented by those 
active in the political process. 
 
 98. See Keith Archer, Redefining Electoral Democracy in Canada, 3 ELECTION L.J. 545 (2004) 
(examining the reform of Canada’s electoral system as a case study in reforming political institutions). 
The Citizens’ Assembly website is http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last visited Dec. 21, 
2006). 
 99. See BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, supra note 10, at 3–
8. 
 100. See FINAL REFERENDUM RESULTS: REFERENDUM ON ELECTORAL REFORM (2005), available 
at http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/ge2005/finalrefresults.htm. 
 101. See Assemb. Const. Amend. 28, supra note 10 (dying in committee after being introduced by 
Assembly Members Canciamilla and Richman). In addition, a citizens assembly is under consideration 
in Ontario. See News Release, Office of the Premier, Ontarians to Have a Say on Electoral Reform 
(Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/Product.asp?ProductID=251. See also ETHAN J. 
LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT (2004) (proposing an institution like a citizens assembly, a fourth, “popular,” branch of 
government in a creative proposal to make direct democracy more deliberative). 
 102. Although the CIIOC members are not selected by lot, as in the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly, they are more like ordinary citizens than are legislators. Even in a world of term limits, most 
legislators have extensive political experience and are more likely to be professional politicians than 
citizen legislators. In contrast, CIIOC members cannot be elected or appointed politicians and will have 
been selected through the mechanism of direct democracy. 
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B.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIIOC AS AN IMPLEMENTATION 
INTERVENOR 
In the most comprehensive analysis of the implementation problem, 
Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and Kiewiet identify four conditions affecting 
the degree of compliance with popular initiatives.103 The CIIOC, 
particularly as part of the larger Dual Path Initiative Framework, implicates 
three of the four conditions and does so in ways that will result in fuller 
compliance with the wishes of voters than occurs now. 
First, lowering the technical and/or political costs of implementation 
leads to greater compliance by a legislature.104 Technical costs are affected 
by the clarity of drafting an initiative because they include “the time and 
monetary costs of having legislative staff determine how to implement 
aspects of the initiative.”105 The first and second reading periods should 
reduce the technical costs of implementation and thereby increase the 
probability of compliance. The CIIOC can tilt the balance of political costs 
in favor of implementation, as well as positively affect technical costs of 
monitoring mandated programs. Most initiative sponsors do not have the 
financial resources to oversee the post-election process, and many disband 
after the measure has passed. Thus, they currently find it difficult to impose 
significant political costs on legislators for ignoring voter-passed 
initiatives. An oversight commission, however, that provides “sunshine” 
and has enforcement authority creates a greater chance that there will be 
political costs for undermining voter-passed initiatives. By creating 
political costs for failing to implement an initiative’s dictates, oversight 
helps to equalize the costs politicians face if they implement an initiative 
that works against their self-interest and the costs of not following the 
voters’ wishes. To the extent that oversight shifts the balance toward 
implementation, the oversight committee will have a positive effect on the 
probability of implementation. 
Second, an initiative is more likely to be implemented if those 
supporting the measure can impose effective sanctions on initiative leaders 
or agents who do not comply with the initiative.106 Currently, initiative 
proponents have very limited sanctioning ability.107 Under our proposal, 
their power to punish recalcitrant politicians and bureaucrats is greatly 
 
 103. See GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 15–25. 
 104. Id. at 20. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 21. 
 107. See Gerber et al., The Politics of Implementation, supra note 4, at 51–52. 
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augmented. Initiative sponsors select who sits on the commission, and they 
will choose agents who are likely to have common interests and push 
forcefully for fuller implementation. The oversight commission will have 
the ability to publicize the actions of the implementers through hearings, 
publications, press conferences, and enforcement actions. By bringing 
lawsuits and other proceedings, they can use the coercive power of the state 
to increase compliance. Politicians are primarily concerned about 
reelection;108 if they anticipate that the information and attention created by 
the oversight commission is likely to affect their reelection prospects, they 
will exercise greater energy in policy implementation. Not all politicians 
will change their behavior as a result of the additional publicity brought by 
the CIIOC. Some represent districts that did not support the initiative and 
thus face no electoral backlash;109 others will anticipate that different issues 
will dominate any reelection campaign. However, the CIIOC will increase 
the chance that failure to implement popular initiatives will result in some 
punishment for some legislators on election day. 
A third condition that increases compliance is the ability and 
willingness of the public or others who support the initiative to observe the 
actions of the legislature.110 For example, although initiatives imposing 
legislative term limits are enormously unpopular with lawmakers 
themselves, they are fully complied with because the failure to leave office 
at the end of the term is easily observable. Even if the voters forget how 
long a particular representative has served, the representative’s challenger 
and the press can bring the matter to the voters’ attention.111 Term limits 
are an unusual case; in most circumstances, voters and information 
intermediaries face substantial difficulties in learning of the actions of 
initiative leaders and agents. Our framework directly addresses this issue 
by creating a standing entity with the resources to oversee implementation 
and with the incentive to ensure fuller compliance. Importantly, the 
technical staff and budget of the CIIOC will help to level the playing field 
between the legislators and the public, thereby increasing compliance with 
the initiative’s dictates. 
 
 108. This is the standard assumption in the legislation scholarship. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 14–15 (1974) (“It seems fair to characterize the modern 
Congress as an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers.”). 
 109. See Daniel A. Smith, Homeward Bound? Micro-level Legislative Responsiveness to Ballot 
Initiatives, 1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 50, 56–57 (2001). 
 110. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 22. 
 111. An additional factor in the success of the term limits initiatives is that they were backed by 
several well-funded national organizations that did not disband after succeeding in passing the 
measures. For a discussion of the term limits provision of California Proposition 140 of 1990, and the 
implementation problem, see id. at 57–59.  
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The fourth condition affecting implementation is the number of people 
required for full compliance: as that number grows, the probability of full 
compliance goes to zero.112 The addition of an oversight commission does 
not address this concern with implementation. Proponents concerned about 
this factor, however, can use the time during the first two reading periods to 
design legislation that minimizes the number of required participants. We 
suspect, however, that reforms often require many agents to implement 
them appropriately, so the ability of proponents to reduce the threat to their 
measures by reducing the number of parties involved is limited. 
Although the CIIOC, together with the Dual Path Initiative 
Framework, is not a panacea for the problems associated with initiative 
implementation, creating this sort of innovative oversight mechanism will 
reduce problems with compliance. By improving the execution of initiative 
policy, public policy will better represent the goals of citizens. 
V.  CONCLUSION: MORE THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL 
EQUILIBRIUM AFTER ADOPTION OF THE DUAL PATH 
INITIATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Our previous discussion has suggested some aspects of the political 
equilibrium that would result from adoption of our proposal. It is worth 
noting briefly several other changes to the political landscape that we 
expect. First, we do not anticipate that our reforms will significantly change 
the balance between statutory and constitutional initiatives because we do 
not alter the qualification requirements for either type of initiative. 
Currently, initiative proponents with the choice use statutory initiatives 
more than popularly generated constitutional amendments, even though 
legislatures have the ability to amend and/or repeal statutory initiatives in 
all states except California.113 Adding new restrictions (mandatory 
reauthorization after a decade of experience) to constitutional initiatives 
will make popular constitutional change relatively less attractive than it is 
now. So if there is any shift, it should favor increased use of the statutory 
route, with the corresponding benefit of the possibility of legislative 
involvement after enactment, allowing flexibility to change the policy over 
time. 
Second, the new equilibrium will result in a different number of 
initiatives appearing on the ballot, although the direction of the change is 
uncertain because there are several cross-cutting factors at play. Our 
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proposal is intended to give initiative proponents an opportunity to qualify 
policy statements more easily than they can now qualify either type of 
initiative. The policy statements are less complicated than the text of an 
initiative, making them easier to sell to voters in a signature gathering drive 
and reducing the costs for drafting them. Thus, we predict that more policy 
statements will be qualified to move to the second reading period than are 
currently qualified for the ballot now. Furthermore, the lower costs of 
qualification (because there is no need to draft detailed text) will encourage 
more small groups and grassroots efforts to pursue the initiative process 
than do so in the current, more costly system. Although our proposal does 
not reduce the power of money in the qualification stage, we do level the 
playing field for those groups whom the inventors of direct democracy 
hoped to empower: grassroots groups that are more likely to reflect 
majoritarian preferences somehow blocked in the legislative process. 
Countervailing forces, however, may discourage the expenditure of 
money and effort on an initiative. The institutionalized possibility of 
legislative action during the second reading stage makes any policy gains 
less certain. Although proponents can still place the measure on the ballot 
no matter what happens in the second reading stage—legislative action 
does not foreclose this possibility—voters often defeat both proposals when 
there are competing initiatives, and legislatively backed ballot measures 
tend to succeed more than popularly generated ones. The combined effect 
of more legislative involvement and reduced durability (through mandatory 
reauthorizations for constitutional initiatives and legislative involvement in 
statutory ones) will decrease the value of initiatives. By lowering the value 
of an initiative, our reform should result in fewer initiatives on the ballot. In 
other words, more policy statements may qualify, but fewer initiatives may 
appear on the ballot, as proponents bargain with legislators more readily 
under our proposed incentive structure. As we observed above, one way to 
think of the first reading stage is as a new route of bill proposal in the 
legislature.114 
Of course, if the legislature does not bargain with proponents or create 
policy in response to policy statements qualified during the first reading 
period, then we expect there to be even more initiatives on the ballot, as 
citizens and interest groups attempt to pass their preferred legislation. 
Legislators may refuse to bargain for various reasons. They may want to 
avoid any blame for a policy that fails (although for compromise 
constitutional reforms, which require a vote of the people, some of the 
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blame will be shared by voters themselves). Lawmakers may be unable to 
bargain successfully when government is divided and the parties are split 
over the appropriate response strategy. The failure of the legislature to 
engage directly with citizens in policy making may lead to electoral 
consequences in the next election, however. 
Another factor affecting the number of initiatives on the ballot is the 
effect of the reapproval requirement for constitutional amendments, which 
requires that supporters place them back on the ballot to remain effective. 
We expect that most constitutional provisions will be requalified for the 
ballot when they expire because the original proponents will be joined in 
this effort by others who benefit from the law. This possibility may 
encourage the legislature to bargain on a compromise, although the 
willingness to bargain will be influenced by the likelihood of success at the 
polls. Whether those initiatives that are requalified through the popular path 
are enacted more easily than those appearing on the ballot in the first place 
is unclear. Voters will have more information about the provisions that are 
being resubmitted to them, a reality that may be positive or negative 
depending on the information. While there may be additional beneficiaries 
campaigning for passage, there may also be groups and people who have 
concretely felt the costs of the law during the decade it has been in place, 
and who will even more aggressively campaign for its defeat. Presumably, 
after some experience, the bargaining dynamics will be shaped, and fewer 
initiatives will actually be put before the people for reenactment either 
because the legislature will eagerly bargain (if reenactment rates are high), 
or proponents will not pay the costs of requalification and a new campaign 
(if reenactment rates are low). 
Third, although the analysis above suggests that initiatives will have 
lower value to proponents because of their reduced durability, the CIIOC 
will actually increase another aspect of the value of popular initiatives. The 
CIIOC will ensure that initiatives enacted by the voters at the polls are 
more fully implemented, at least until they expire, in the case of 
constitutional initiatives, or are repealed by the legislature, in the case of 
statutory measures (an action for which there may be electoral 
consequences). If, in the end, this effect outweighs the former effects, and 
more initiatives end up on the ballot because of the promise of citizen 
oversight, at least they will have had three readings and a chance for 
legislative involvement before they become the law. The role of the CIIOC 
with respect to popularly generated initiatives will encourage the legislature 
to bargain with initiative proponents because a compromise—whether 
statutory or constitutional—will foreclose involvement by the independent 
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group of citizen overseers. Proponents may be willing to give up the 
protection of the CIIOC in return for permanent enactment of a 
legislatively supported constitutional amendment or a statutory solution 
that lawmakers are more likely to enforce since they played a role in its 
design. 
The equilibrium outcome under the new framework for initiatives—
with its dual path process of three readings and the creation of the CIIOC—
hinges in large part on how the legislature reacts to initiative proponents 
during the second reading bargaining game. An active legislature will 
reduce the number of initiatives under this scheme, but an inactive one will 
increase, perhaps greatly, the number of initiatives, and representative 
democracy will trend toward direct democracy within our hybrid system. 
However, all of the initiatives will, ultimately, produce better policy under 
this framework, given the addition of checks and balances into the process 
and the greater probability of compliance. In short, this framework 
promises substantial improvement to institutions of governance and the 
policies they produce. 
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